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The Foreign Fighter Threat
As the battle for Mosul in Iraq rages on, many experts and policymakers have already begun to focus on what the 
inevitable defeat of  Daesh (also known 
as the Islamic State of  Iraq and Syria, or 
ISIS) will mean for Europe. Across the 
corridors of  power in Brussels there is 
a widespread fear that the collapse of  
the organisation will lead to a surge in 
foreign fighters returning to Europe. 
In October, the EU Commissioner for 
the Security Union, Sir Julian King, 
warned: 
Re-taking the Islamic State stronghold 
in northern Iraq can lead to a scenario in 
which violent militants would return to 
Europe … This is a very serious threat 
and we must be prepared to face it. 
Similarly, EU Counterterrorism 
Coordinator Gilles de Kerchove 
cautioned that the bloc would struggle 
to handle the predicted 1,500–2,000 
foreign fighters who may return if  
Daesh is driven out of  its strongholds 
in Mosul and Raqqa, in Syria. On the 
other side of  the pond, the new US 
administration has already taken steps 
to address, among other things, the 
potential danger posed by returning 
foreign fighters by attempting to 
introduce an entry ban affecting seven 
majority-Muslim countries. 
As the events in Syria and Iraq 
unfold, it is clear that Europe’s foreign 
fighter problem is far from over and 
that, in fact, the worst is most likely 
yet to come. In this context, now more 
than ever, it is crucial that policymakers 
get to grips with the complex nature 
of  the foreign fighter phenomenon in 
order to design and implement effective 
countermeasures. 
Even though security circles have 
been grappling with the foreign fighter 
phenomenon for a long time, the 
eruption of  the conflict in Syria has 
seen the issue rise to greater prominence 
in the public consciousness. With an 
unprecedented number of  foreign 
fighters from numerous countries 
attracted to the conflict, policymakers 
are viewing the problem with a sense of  
urgency. This is despite a lack of  clarity 
about the evolving threat and its various 
manifestations. 
The refugee crisis has 
been framed as providing 
terrorists with a free 
pass to enter the EU; in 
reality, terrorists posing 
as refugees remain rare 
exceptions 
Mirroring the development of  
the threat, the initial focus on foreign 
fighters – those who left to join conflicts 
abroad – shifted to include those who 
have returned from conflict theatres and 
then those who did not leave their home 
countries. Often, this shift featured a 
blurring between terrorism and other 
issues: for instance, media coverage of  
recent terror attacks frequently alluded 
to the supposed mental health problems 
of  the perpetrators, despite scant 
evidence of  the presence and nature of  
those problems. Similarly, the refugee 
crisis has been framed as providing 
terrorists with a free pass to enter the 
EU, while, in reality, terrorists posing as 
refugees remain rare exceptions. Both 
narratives, propagated chiefly by the 
mainstream media, further confuse the 
debate. 
The EU still lacks an agreed 
definition of  what a foreign fighter 
is; rather it uses the terms ‘Terrorist’, 
‘Foreign Fighter’ and ‘Foreign Terrorist 
Fighter’ interchangeably. On top of  
this, individual member states’ own 
definitions vary widely. This lack 
of  clarity has not only led to much 
confusion, it has also resulted in a lack 
of  a shared perception of  the foreign 
fighter threat. 
What we have seen, as European 
governments seek to address the 
threat, are a series of  piecemeal 
policies designed to tackle various 
issues perceived to be related in a wider 
sense to the phenomenon of  foreign 
fighters. While many such measures are 
straightforward and implemented in 
numerous affected countries – such as 
legislation prohibiting the financing of  
terrorism – others appear vague both 
in terms of  their aims and the ways to 
achieve them. 
Among these vague measures 
that seem to target not only terrorism 
and extremism, but also a growing 
public perception of  insecurity, is the 
UK’s proposed Counter-Extremism 
and Safeguarding Bill. It was branded 
as ‘confusing’ by a parliament’s Joint 
Committee on Human Rights in July 
for using overly broad definitions 
of  extremism and largely covering 
offences that fall under already existing 
laws. 
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Similarly, the ongoing and costly 
deployment of  military troops in 
France’s main cities under its Vigipirate 
national security alert system, and even 
the ‘burkini ban’ briefly implemented 
in parts of  the country last year, attest 
to uncertainty regarding the concrete 
objectives of  counterterrorism measures. 
And, not least, political expediency plays 
a crucial role in confronting the problem 
of  foreign fighters. 
In this environment of  knee-jerk 
reactions, there appears to be little 
understanding of  the threat’s multiple 
dimensions and, more importantly, how 
these are interconnected. Unless we 
tackle the totality of  the threat using 
an integrated approach, we may simply 
displace activity. Likewise, tackling one 
aspect of  the threat will necessarily 
impact the others, and, in turn, may 
have unintended consequences. 
How Do We Do It Better? 
As the previous examples illustrate, a 
lack of  understanding is leading to quick 
fixes, rather than strategic solutions, to 
respond to arising security needs. To 
counteract this lack of  understanding 
and the resulting incoherence, it is 
helpful to conceptualise the threat 
connected to foreign fighters as four 
distinct but interlinked aspects. These 
must be tackled collectively in order to 
be successful. 
First, the travel of  foreign fighters 
to conflict zones remains a major source 
of  concern, largely because of  the 
likelihood that they will become more 
radicalised in the process, in addition 
to the training and experience they will 
gain in the field. 
An often under-acknowledged 
aspect is the violence against civilians 
they may carry out in their host country. 
We have seen foreign fighters inflict the 
most barbarous acts of  terrorism on the 
local civilian populations, but preventing 
this has, with few notable exceptions, 
rarely been the primary concern of  
Western governments. 
As Daesh continues to lose ground 
in Syria and Iraq, we might not just see a 
reversal of  the foreign fighter flow, but 
also new flows to emerging hotspots. 
Increasingly, Daesh is likely to direct 
Floral tributes outside the Bataclan Theatre in memory of the victims of the November 2015 Paris attacks. The alleged mastermind behind the attacks, 
Abdelhamid Abaaoud, fought with Daesh in Syria before returning to Europe. Courtesy of Adam Davy, PA Archive/PA Images.
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resources to its affiliates across Africa 
and Asia. 
Second, the return of  foreign 
fighters to their home countries is 
widely seen as the greatest threat. 
Returnees may come back to carry 
out attacks themselves, or facilitate 
logistical, financial and recruitment 
activity at home. Reports of  centrally 
dispatched terrorist units as well as 
returnees having been involved in 
large-scale attacks, such as Paris and 
Brussels, underline the potential threat 
from returning foreign fighters, even 
though individuals may follow different 
pathways upon their return. 
While the overwhelming fear of  
policymakers and the public alike is 
returning foreign fighters planning 
acts of  terror in their home countries, 
the reality is that this only represents 
a minority of  cases, with many more 
seeking to leave behind a life of  
extremist violence. 
Increasingly, Daesh is 
likely to direct resources 
to its affiliates across 
Africa and Asia
Thomas Hegghammer’s analyses 
of  foreign fighter-related attacks, for 
instance, assert that merely one in nine 
returnees perpetrated attacks in the 
West between 1990–2010, with that 
number decreasing vastly for the Syrian 
conflict, to one in 360. Thus, for the 
majority of  returning foreign fighters, 
assistance in returning to normal life 
and dealing with mental illness such as 
post-traumatic stress disorder is a more 
necessary policy response. 
Third, the fear generated by the 
foreign fighter phenomenon has 
negatively impacted social cohesion 
across Europe and has fed into the 
increasing polarisation over the refugee 
crisis. In fact, in many tabloid headlines 
the two have become irresponsibly 
conflated. 
With populism on the rise in many 
European countries and the US, anti-
Muslim sentiment has been central 
to the political campaigns of  the 
far right. For instance, The German 
party Alternative für Deutschland – 
polling as the third-strongest party in 
the country – has recently confirmed 
its stance on the matter, adopting the 
phrase ‘Islam is not part of  Germany’ 
in its manifesto. 
Reassuring increasingly fearful 
voters, while not alienating Muslim 
communities, will remain a balancing 
act for politicians in the years to come. 
However, this balancing act will only 
become more difficult in the coming 
years, if  we also see a rise in violence by 
left-wing extremists in reaction to the 
rise of  the right. 
Lastly, an increased risk is posed 
by lone actors and home-grown 
terrorists who do not travel to conflict 
areas abroad. These commit attacks 
in nominal affiliation with terrorist 
groups in their countries of  residence. 
There are those who, having been 
prevented from travelling to Syria or 
Iraq, subsequently choose to carry out 
an attack in their home country, as was 
the case for one of  the perpetrators 
of  the Charlie Hebdo attack in January 
2015. Then there are those who never 
intended to travel, but were inspired 
by the foreign fighter phenomenon 
to carry out lone-actor attacks in their 
home country. Such attacks have been 
on the rise in recent months: the June 
2016 nightclub shooting in Orlando, 
Florida, and two attacks in Würzburg 
and Ansbach, Germany the following 
month are believed to have been carried 
out by lone perpetrators. 
Daesh has long encouraged such 
lone-actor attacks, with spokesperson 
Abu Mohammed Al-Adnani calling on 
supporters to carry out attacks in their 
home countries in May 2016. 
Linking the Four 
Dimensions 
Tackling these four interlinked threats 
requires systematic consideration of  
the law of  unintended consequences – 
targeting one threat may have a negative 
impact on the others. For example, if  
policy aims to prevent people travelling 
to Syria and Iraq, for instance by revoking 
their passports, there is a risk that those 
people will prepare terrorist attacks as 
lone actors in their home country. 
On the other hand, there is a serious 
risk that if  people are allowed to travel 
to Syria and Iraq, they will contribute 
not only to violence there but also 
assist in the planning or preparation of  
terrorist attacks back home or in a third 
country. 
And even if  policymakers 
prioritise domestic over foreign 
security by allowing foreign fighters 
to leave, but not return, the threat may 
simply evolve as they move to third 
countries and organise themselves in 
places in which thorough surveillance 
is impossible. This issue of  where 
Daesh fighters will go, as they are 
driven out of  its strongholds is a 
growing concern. 
The only way to tackle the 
foreign fighter phenomenon is 
a comprehensive approach that 
addresses all dimensions of  the 
threat, while focusing on its most 
salient aspects. Thus, a priority 
on rehabilitating returned foreign 
fighters needs to go hand-in-hand 
with emphasis on security-centric 
measures, such as the surveillance 
of  homegrown networks and 
sympathisers, to prevent both travel 
abroad and attacks at home. Security 
cooperation with third states, as well as 
improved border control mechanisms 
beyond the EU, are essential in 
monitoring and counteracting the 
displacement of  foreign fighters. 
Lastly, and perhaps the most difficult 
dimension, is the potential inherent 
in the foreign fighter phenomenon 
to divide the West’s increasingly 
multiethnic societies. 
Refraining from grand security 
policy gestures to appease conservative 
voters requires true leadership in the 
face of  upcoming elections and populist 
parties on the rise. Nevertheless, sober 
judgment of  which policy measures 
do, in fact, address the foreign fighter 
phenomenon in a comprehensive 
manner is the only way to be effective 
in countering it. 
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